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1. Introduction 
This report summarizes the discussions and findings of the Workshop on Intelligent 
Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defence and Resilience organized by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) research group IST-152-RTG. The 
workshop was held in Prague, Czech Republic, on 18–20 October 2017, at the 
premises of the Czech Technical University in Prague. The workshop was 
unclassified, releasable to public, and open to representatives of NATO Partnership 
for Peace (PfP)/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) nations. The workshop 
was chaired by program co-chairs Prof Michal Pechoucek, Czech Technical 
University, Prague, Czech Republic, and Dr Alexander Kott, US Army Research 
Laboratory, United States. 
This workshop explored opportunities in the area of future intelligent autonomous 
agents in cyber operations. Such agents may potentially serve as fundamental 
game-changers in the way cyber defense and offense are conducted. Their 
autonomous reasoning and cyber actions for prevention, detection, and active 
response to cyber threats may become critical enablers for the field of 
cybersecurity. Cyber weapons (malware) are rapidly growing in their sophistication 
and their ability to act autonomously and adapt to specific conditions encountered 
in a friendly system/network. Current practices of cyber defense against advanced 
threats continue to be heavily reliant on largely manually driven analysis, detection, 
and defeat of such malware. There is a growing recognition that future cyber 
defense should involve extensive use of partially autonomous agents that actively 
patrol the friendly network, and detect and react to hostile activities rapidly (far 
faster than human reaction time), before the hostile malware is able to inflict major 
damage, evade friendly agents, or destroy friendly agents. This requires cyber-
defense agents with a significant degree of intelligence, autonomy, self-learning, 
and adaptability. Autonomy, however, comes with difficult challenges of trust and 
control by humans.  
The workshop investigated how the directions of current and future science and 
technology may impact and define potential breakthroughs in this field. The 
presentations and discussions at the workshop produced this report. It focuses on 
the following questions that the participants of the workshop saw as particularly 
important: 
• In what computing and tactical environments would such an agent operate? 
• What data would be available for the agent to observe or ingest? 
• What actions would the agent be able to take?  
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• How would such an agent plan a complex course of actions? 
• Would the agent learn from its experiences, and how? 
• How would the agent collaborate with humans? 
• How can we ensure that the agent will not take undesirable destructive 
actions? 
• Is it possible to help envision such an agent with a simple example?  
In addition to this report, the papers presented at the workshop were published as a 
separate volume, Intelligent Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defence and Resilience: 
Proceedings of the NATO IST-152 Workshop, Prague, Czech Republic, 18–20 
October 2017, edited by Alexander Kott and Michal Pechoucek, which can be 
found online at http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2057/. 
2. Environmental Considerations for Autonomous Agent 
Deployment 
Authors: Ryan Thomas and Martin Drašar 
With the proliferation of machine-learning (ML) methods in recent years, it is likely 
that autonomous agents will become commonplace in day-to-day military 
operations. We expect a significant boost in their capabilities owing to both 
algorithmic advancements and adoption of purpose-built ML hardware. However, 
the range of agents’ functions will still be, in the foreseeable future, limited by a 
number of environmental factors, which we attempt to enumerate.  
In this section, we recognize 2 types of autonomous agents as 2 extremes on the 
capability scale. At one extreme are preprogrammed heuristic agents, responding 
only to specified stimuli based on a set of preset actions. At the other extreme are 
robust intelligent systems with advanced planning and learning characteristics. 
Capability is then the aggregate of an agent’s intelligence, awareness, 
connectedness, control, distributedness, level of autonomy, and adaptability.  
Environmental factors limit the specific functions and abilities of particular agents 
and the combination of these factors place an upper bound on agents’ capabilities. 
The following sections provide a list of these factors and their impact. 
2.1 Mobility 
Autonomous agents deployed at stationary structures (e.g., buildings or weapon 
systems) should suffer the fewest limitations in their operation, as it can reasonably 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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be expected that such agents will have enough power, processing capacity, 
connectivity, and other resources needed to carry out the most complicated of tasks. 
These systems will be restricted mostly by the ML state of the art.  
Agents deployed on mobile platforms (e.g., vehicles, Soldiers, or missiles) will 
inevitably be limited by intermittent connectivity; power, space, and processing 
constraints; or even the physical implications of their actions. Furthermore, for 
mobile systems, it is likely that the agent will be located at a centralized point in 
the architecture, rather than be distributed across all subsystems. This is due to the 
expected difficulty in accrediting systems with robust intelligent behaviors. 
2.2 Lethality 
Agents operating in systems with lethal capacity will either have to undergo much 
tighter scrutiny or be limited in their actions to prevent the creation of accidental or 
exploited killer bots. In such systems, it is easy to envision agents and humans 
performing as a team, with the human having the final authority for decisions with 
lethal implications. This will require developments in human‒machine trust, 
interfaces, and planning. 
Another option to safeguard lethality would be the use of a 2-tier infrastructure, 
where lethal means are physically separated and thus inaccessible to even a rogue 
autonomous agent. The ML would control the nonlethal tier only, allowing more 
conventional means (or, as described previously, a human) to control the lethal tier. 
2.3 Criticality 
Critical systems, whose failure has severe consequences, mostly operate with clear 
separation of responsibilities and are handled by rigorously trained personnel. 
Failures are reduced by the application of processes, which limit the impact of 
human error. Autonomous agents will likely introduce whole new classes of errors, 
so these error-controlling processes must be updated accordingly.  
There are 3 likely approaches to this: 
1) Improvements in the understanding of ML operations and performance 
limits will enable better scrutiny of the inner workings of autonomous 
agents, constraining the range of possible ML errors and formally proving 
the scope of exhibited behaviors.  
2) Testing methodologies and testbeds will improve, allowing autonomous 
agents to undergo a battery of conformance tests exhaustive enough to give 
informal guarantees of the agent’s operation with acceptable confidence.  
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3) Autonomous agents will be deployed redundantly, allowing for robust and 
resilient operations. Techniques such as voting (e.g., 3 implementations 
with a majority voting on a next action) could be used. 
2.4 Connectivity 
Most mobile platforms will suffer connectivity problems or forced connection 
losses. Autonomous agents, which rely on communications links to enable swarm 
intelligence, command and control (C2), or computation offloading, would be 
severely impaired during connection loss. Therefore, any such ML functionality 
requiring connectivity must be designed with respect to the communications 
environment and timescale in conjunction with required ML decision accuracy. For 
systems in unreliable environments, which need stable communication channels to 
arrive at decisions quickly or require accurate and reliable decisions under all 
conditions, it is up to debate as to whether the presence of autonomous agents is 
worth the personnel training extension, related updates to operational processes, 
and associated certification hurdles. 
2.5 Power and Processing Constraints 
Given the currently immense computation requirements for any autonomous and 
learning behavior, any hardware able to run sufficiently advanced agents will 
require nontrivial space, power, and cooling. Unless there is a significant leap in 
technology, this will limit the available resources for agents, especially for 
deployment in mobile platforms. Developers of agents and policy makers will have 
to carefully consider which autonomous functionalities are necessary or beneficial 
enough.  
There is great potential in bio-inspired autonomy, assisted by mechanical and 
structural features on the host platforms. For instance, insects such as moths and 
flies are an inspiring mix of clever sensor arrays, simple processing cortexes, and 
advanced mechanical wing design that could enable low-power, low-processing 
micro-autonomous air platforms. 
2.6 Commoditization and Standardization of Agents for 
Environments 
We expect that some standard classification of autonomous agents according to 
their capability and requirements is inevitable. Such classification would ease the 
adoption process by reducing the need to evaluate each agent in a specific context 
with regard to whether an agent conforms to a class specification. Military systems 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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then could be limited to specific classes of autonomous agents, thus prescribing the 
level of autonomy such systems can have. 
3. Data Sources for Autonomous Agents 
Authors: Markus Kont and Alex Poylisher 
Possible data sources for autonomous agents can be largely divided into 5 
categories: 1) network traffic, 2) event logs, 3) hardware sensor data, 4) operating 
system (OS)-level software sensor data, and 5) high-level inputs. 
Network traffic can be analyzed on several levels of granularity. On the flow level, 
NetFlow records can be collected from Layer 2 switches and Layer 3 routers (Claise 
2004). Where practical in terms of collection/storage overheads, these can be 
supplemented by full or partial packet captures, and several deep packet inspection 
methods can then be employed for intrusion detection and traffic indexing.  
Event logs can be largely divided between unstructured textual data that would need 
to be processed with clustering and correlation methods (Vaarandi and Pihelgas 
2015; Vaarandi et al. 2015) and structured logs that commonly provide a mix of 
numerical and categorical data. A subset of categorical event logs is audit log data, 
whether it be via generic logging of all user commands or tripwires from policy 
violations, confidential file access, integrity violations, and so on. All major OSs 
provide this functionality via specialized daemons (e.g., the syslog framework in 
Linux). 
Another major source of information is numerical metrics from hardware 
performance counters (e.g., central processing unit [CPU] and memory usage, disk 
and network input/output [I/O], cache hits/misses, and so on) and physical sensors 
(e.g., temperature, voltage monitoring, GPS location, battery status, and so on). 
These measurements can also be correlated with measured human responses from 
sensors attached to human bodies, such as vital signs metrics, which can be quite 
relevant in a military context, but (like many other aspects) depend heavily on the 
agent use case (Currie et al. 2017).  
OS-level sensor data include system call monitoring, in-memory analysis, kernel 
execution tracing, protocol state machine tracking for Layer 2 and 3 (Ionescu et al. 
2009), and so on. All major OSs provide this functionality (e.g., sysdig, 
procfs/sysfs, kprobe/jprobe, Berkeley Packet Filter [BPF]/extended BPF [eEBPF]-
based tracing in Linux). 
Finally, high-level inputs such as mission/goal tracking data are essential in 
contextualizing other measurements.  
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It is also possible to implement decoy methods and moving target defense (MTD), 
even inside a single node, as it is possible to implement this via a simple kernel 
module that would be able to integrate system call tracking and notification to the 
higher detection framework (Kerber et al. 2015). 
Intrusion detection and sensing tools typically use signatures or behavior analysis 
(Thompson and Abello 2015; Soudi et al. 2015). Signature-based detection is by 
far the most commonly used method in practice due to performance considerations, 
but this method is prone to false positives and the detection quality depends on prior 
knowledge of attack vectors (Blumbergs et al. 2016). Note that such feeds and 
analysis methods often feed into each other. For example, network intrusion 
detection produces categorical event log data that can then be further processed 
using event correlation and behavior analysis methods. There is also the need for 
constant aggregation and preprocessing of data. Particularly important are feature 
extraction, data conversion to a numerical vector space, and the reduction of 
dimensionality. Datamining and ML methods are simply not designed for 
processing data in its raw form, thus intelligent and dynamic conversion is needed 
(Ma and Huang 2017). Exact methods of data collection and processing, however, 
depend heavily on the use case and require the creation of custom data processing 
model(s). Note that data collection and sensing modules intertwine heavily with the 
dynamic learning methods that are to be applied. 
The data sources and methods listed previously can be used both for detection and 
training. However, data acquisition for dynamic learning tasks is a significant and 
well-known problem. Operational data from real-world systems may not be 
available due to institutional or legal restrictions. Collecting data from military 
systems introduces further challenges. Apart from security considerations, the 
storage space on fielded systems (often embedded) can be very limited. Thus, 
retention methods may prune viable training data even before the device returns 
from the mission. Even when available, operational data are almost always 
unlabeled and incomplete. For example, network connections between 
compromised workstations and C2 servers are visible from network data, but these 
connections are often obfuscated and nearly identical to regular background traffic.  
Due to the aforementioned difficulties, most academic research in the public 
domain relies on the relatively small number of publicly available and well-
researched data sets. This is a valid methodology for generic datamining and ML 
research, but it severely impairs the feasibility of using the proposed academic 
methods on real-world systems or coming up with relevant data models in the first 
place. As dynamic methods are known to be sensitive to parameter tuning and data 
set characteristics, a method proven to work on one data set may not work with 
another (Sommer and Paxson 2010). To make matters worse, label-drift, or 
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classification when features and labels are not known in advance or may change 
over time, is a significant problem for intrusion detection research and in general 
for ML in the cybersecurity domain, as in adversarial environments opponents are 
constantly evolving new attack techniques to bypass defensive methods. 
Significant research is currently conducted on dynamic learning and threat 
detection. However, this work is held back by gaps in validation methods. There is 
a clear and pressing need to create and maintain up-to-date data sets, which would 
account for missing entries, the need for correlation, and label-drift problems. One 
excellent source of such data can be training exercises (e.g., CyberShield), but data 
collection so far has been secondary to achieving the scenario objectives. Moreover, 
the timespan of a single exercise is compressed and may not exhibit the long-term 
temporal patterns needed for anomaly detection (e.g., those of an advanced 
persistent threat [APT]) and the scope of an exercise is likely to be small in terms 
of network size. 
While actually collecting and labeling more of the exercise data are comparatively 
easy to address in exercise planning, the scale/timespan/variety of live exercises is 
by definition limited by resource availability. A complementary approach is to 
create realistic data sets on demand in emulated/simulated testbeds capable of 
supporting arbitrary network topologies, sufficiently real hardware, real 
OS/application/attack/defense software, and a combination of synthetic and real 
actors. This approach enables a much larger exercise scale/timespan, significant 
variety, repeatability, and data collection tailored for a particular need by the 
researchers themselves. A well-known early example of this approach is the Cyber 
Defense Technology Experimental Research Laboratory (DETERLab; Benzel 
2011); a more recent and militarily-relevant example is the Cyber Security Virtual 
Assured Network (CyberVAN; Chadha et al. 2016), in which multiple diverse 
labeled and fully reproducible data sets were generated over the past 2 years 
(Bowen et al. 2016). 
4. Decision Flow-Based Agent Action Planning 
Authors: Benjamin Blakely and Paul Theron 
Automated intelligent agents for the purposes of cyber defense may be as varied as 
the purposes and missions of the systems in which they reside. The determination 
of an optimal course of action may need to be computed in a small amount of time, 
with limited resources. An agent may be required to respond to the actions of 
intelligent actors (human or otherwise) with partial knowledge about the system it 
is protecting or the impact of its own actions. Here we propose a progressive 
decision-making approach that takes into account not only the properties of the 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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agent itself, but the environment and context in which a decision must be made. We 
propose that additional research into the specific criteria for the optimal decision 
mechanism and acceptance of a proposed course of action, generalizability of such 
criteria, and determination of how traditional autonomous agent techniques perform 
in a cyber-defense context, would assist in the development of special-purpose 
intelligent agents for defending cyber systems from adversarial attack. 
The problem of determining the correct course of action for an automated agent has 
been extensively studied, as summarized, for instance, in Maes (1990) and 
Ferguson (1995). This research is built on decision theory, including psychological 
theories of decision making (Edwards 1954), rational choice (Simon 1956; Day 
1971), decision making with limited resources in psychology (Kahneman 2002) 
and computer science (Bratman 1988), and decision making in complex situations 
when primed by earlier experience (Klein 1988).  
From here, the overall construction of agents (Jennings 1998) has been explored. 
This may focus on their overall behavior, such as logic-based (deduction), reactive 
(mapping from situation to action), belief-desire-intention (data structures 
representing these properties of the agent), or layered architectures (software at 
differing levels of abstraction) (Wooldridge 2013). As we are primarily interested 
in decision making and planning, it is relevant to look at taxonomies of how agents 
determine a course of action. Russel and Norvig (2013) separate agents into simple 
reflex (only using current perception), model-based (environmental models to infer 
unobservable conditions), goal-based (contributions toward a goal), utility-based 
(desirability of an action), and learning (improves based on past outcomes) agents. 
No single approach is appropriate for cyber defense, and thus an optimal 
(correctness and efficiency of computation) decision is likely to require 
progressively increasing difficulty and reliance on mission-specific safety 
parameters. One possible model would consist of the following stages: Offline 
Machine Learning, Pattern Recognition, Online Machine Learning, Escalation to a 
Human Operator, Game-Theoretic Option Search, and Fail Safe. Decisions 
proposed by each sequential (in our model, but could potentially be extended to 
parallel, allowing for consensus or value-based approaches) stage are arbitrated for 
suitability by a decision review stage before being communicated to the relevant 
actuators (logical or physical). If any stage cannot be executed due to environmental 
and system parameters or the agent is unable to make a conclusive or acceptable 
decision, the agent must proceed to the next most-intensive method of decision 
making.  
Loaded into such an agent would be patterns derived from offline learning. This 
may consist of heuristic or signature-based logic that has achieved sufficient 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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confidence that it allows for making decisions in unambiguous situations. Such 
offline learning may condense significant amounts of historical and contextual data 
into a small set of criteria, which can be loaded on potentially low-resource agents. 
This is an important consideration in scenarios such as network appliances, small 
drones, munitions, or other systems, which do not have capacity for a large amount 
of storage and computation onboard. When a set of percepts is to be evaluated by 
the agent, it will first use this offline learning to determine if the percepts represent 
a known pattern that can be directly acted upon. 
If there is no sufficiently high-confidence match or the proposed action is not 
acceptable to the decision analysis arbiter, the agent must make a determination as 
to whether it is in a state conducive to online ML. While this decision is partially 
static given the parameters of the agent, environmental parameters such as available 
power, time available to make a decision, or safety margins might make it infeasible 
to engage a ML engine. If this is not the case, the agent may use ensemble methods 
such as random forest, or less resource-intensive singular methods, to consider the 
current state and historical actions and consequences, and make an appropriate 
decision. The outcome of a decision from any stage, assuming the decision analysis 
arbiter accepts the decision, would be fed back into this engine so that it can benefit 
from all actions of the agent. 
It may then be necessary to escalate to a human operator to provide alternatives and 
ask for a decision or indicate that no acceptable options have been determined, 
requiring human intervention. This is predicated upon either the presence of or path 
to communication to a human operator, as well as sufficient time for an agent to 
invoke a human. Otherwise, the agent must skip this step entirely. 
If the agent has still failed to reach an acceptable decision, it might yet have enough 
information (preloaded or from previous stages) to make a reasonable guess as to 
the outcomes of various actions, even steps ahead. Using this information, the agent 
can use game-theoretic techniques to construct a short time-horizon decision tree 
(“short” being relative to the mission parameters and agent resources), evaluate the 
potential outcomes, and find one that is suitably within compliance, to a given 
probability, of the desired mission outcome. 
Finally, the agent may be required to enter a fail-safe state based upon 
preprogrammed failure behavior in accordance with mission parameters. Is it 
acceptable to simply take no action? Take an action with a lower threshold for 
confidence in efficacy or safety? Terminate, return home, or self-destruct? There is 
no single action that will satisfy all cases, requiring the terminal stage to be loaded 
before agent deployment in accordance with the mission profile.   
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5. Autonomous Cyber Agents: Potential Actions 
Author: Nathaniel Evans 
Agent-based modeling offers a method of embodying a goal-directed cybersecurity 
expert in an autonomous software program (Macal and North 2005). The software-
based agent has goals, performing various actions such as the following to achieve 
them: evaluating its performance, sensing its environment, performing actions, and 
communicating and cooperating with other agents and humans. This section 
describes an autonomous cyber agent with the minor goals of resisting, detecting, 
and responding to adversaries, all of which work to achieve its major goal of 
defending and protecting its own system of computers.  
To achieve its goals, the agent must incorporate several capabilities. Firstly, the 
agent needs to perceive its environment by evaluating the state of its computer 
system(s), detecting changes, and deciding whether those changes are suspicious. 
If it does indeed detect suspicious changes, the agent must respond in an appropriate 
and timely manner. Secondly, the agent needs to manage trust relationships with 
other agents and humans through communication and cooperation. Lastly, 
throughout its activities, the agent needs to assess itself and its goals, and 
proactively initiate goal-directed actions to improve its performance and exploit 
opportunities when possible (Fink et al. 2014). 
The following sections describe the 3 main goals of the cybersecurity agent: 
response, proactive, and social. 
5.1 Response Goal 
The response goal focuses on actions for protection and recovery from a detected 
suspicious activity. To achieve the response goal, the agent needs to perform a 
variety of activities, ranging from strict protective measures to tailored increases in 
protective measures (Yuan et al. 2014). The strictest protective measures include 
the shutdown of processes or an entire computer system, or disconnecting the 
computer from communications networks. Other measures preserve several 
important facets of data security, including confidentiality (through encryption), 
protection (by scrambling), and availability (by destroying the data). The agent can 
also restore the system to its last well-known good state. 
The agent needs the capability to tailor and increase its protective measures through 
increased restrictions on configurations, processes, and communication (Bartos and 
Rehak 2012). For example, changes to configurations can be prohibited, 
configurations and files can be locked, processes can be isolated, and 
communications can be restricted by direction (inbound and outbound), location 
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(IP address, hostname, etc.), and characteristics (latency, bandwidth, speed, and 
amount). 
While responding, the agent communicates with other agents to identify and 
characterize potential adversaries. If possible, the agent should characterize 
adversaries as benign or malicious, provide a warning of potential foes, recommend 
a response action, and even receive guidance from other agents on how to respond. 
To improve future responses, the agent needs to record and learn from incidents, as 
well as the actions and outcomes that they instigate. To improve its own resilience, 
the agent needs the capability to clone itself. 
5.2 Proactive Goal 
The proactive goal lists behaviors that help an agent improve its performance or its 
protection capability. To achieve the proactive goal, the agent should not simply 
act in response to its environment; it should be able to exhibit opportunistic, goal-
directed behavior and take initiatives when appropriate. 
Internally, the agent needs to evaluate itself frequently and apply updates (patches) 
when necessary.  
The agent also needs to assess the state of a system, understand what is normal, and 
have methods of detecting and characterizing anomalies, including analysis of all 
event logs. Toward detecting anomalies, the agent needs change-detection tools to 
discover unauthorized modifications to the filesystem, network device 
configuration, or application code. 
The agent shall assist in the deployment and management of proactive defense 
technologies such as MTD and cyber deception. Various MTDs can benefit from 
oversight by autonomous cyber agents, including those that focus on process 
rotation (e.g., Morphisec), application rotation (e.g., Dynamic Application Rotation 
Environment [DARE] MTD), OS rotation (e.g., Multiple OS Rotational 
Environment [MORE] MTD; Thompson et al. 2014), IP rotation (e.g., 
Morphinator), and network path rotation (e.g., Stream Splitting MTD). Agents can 
also employ various cyber-deception methods, including direct observation hiding, 
process hiding, data hiding, network hiding, investigation hiding, and social hiding.  
5.3 Social Goal 
The social goal describes how and why an agent should communicate and cooperate 
with other agents and humans. This collaboration essentially improves the overall 
protection of a given computer system (Jennings et al. 2014).  
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The primary communication ensures the sharing of information that will allow 
other agents to understand the state of the computer system, its adversaries, and its 
responses. The shared information includes whom and what has been blocked, what 
has been allowed, and the associated signatures that have been used to create these 
blocks and allows. 
Other systems need alerts from the agent on the actions that were taken and the 
expected effects of said actions. The agent needs to maintain awareness about the 
state of other agents, including uptime and the ability to respond by cloning peers. 
Establishing and managing trust relationships enable agents to cooperate and rely 
upon each other. The agents need methods to manage those trust relationships, 
including the ability to create, break, and detect violations within trust relationships. 
Agents shall interact, when appropriate, with other artificial agents and humans in 
order to complete their own problem solving and help others with their activities. 
6. Applying Machine-Learning Algorithms to Cyber-Physical 
System Security 
Authors: Nandi Leslie, Rajdeep Singh, Maria Rigaki, and S Jay Yang 
Cybersecurity analysis is transforming to support cyber-physical system (CPS) 
security: the needs for protecting the data confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
have accelerated with the increased autonomy and connectivity of engineered 
systems. Yet, there are significant research gaps in CPS security. Several research 
questions are what specific ML algorithms exist for securing CPS processes and 
data, whether considering adversarial learning and cyber deception can enhance 
CPS security, and to what extent can useful cyber-defense information be learned 
to predict or prevent cyberattacks. For CPS requiring standalone functionality over 
extended periods of time, the entities tend to have significant constraints on 
computational resource use for network, battery power, and memory usage, which 
also impact the design of the cyber systems monitoring and securing substantive 
amounts of data. In this case, when considering methods for CPS defense, whether 
for commercial or mission systems, traditional intrusion detection methods are 
required yet inadequate for ensuring that these systems operate efficiently and 
securely without human support or maintenance. For example, in an Internet of 
Things (IoT) environment, mobile Android devices can function successfully with 
lightweight intrusion detection systems (IDSs)—these IDSs operate with minimal 
computational resources by using n-grams of packet payloads to classify malicious 
network traffic combined with supervised linear classification and Bloom filters 
(Wang and Stolfo 2004; Chang et al. 2013; Yu and Leslie 2017). Furthermore, 
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replacing signature-based IDS with these computational algorithms can improve 
IDS performance, including efficiency and prediction performance (Wang and 
Stolfo 2004; Chang et al. 2013; Yu et al. 2014; Yu and Leslie 2017). It is known 
that ML and anomaly-based detection algorithms can improve detection accuracy 
because these computational methods allow for the detection of novel cyberattacks, 
where the exploits were previously unknown or no signatures exist (i.e., “zero-day” 
cyberattacks), which is by definition infeasible with signature-based or misuse 
detection models for IDS (Lunt 1993; Wang and Stolfo 2004). However, these 
anomaly-based algorithms for IDS tend to have high false-positive rates (Lunt 
1993)—benign packets are frequently misclassified as malicious—requiring 
human analysts to review the IDS alerts in more detail. 
The December 2010 report of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) included cybersecurity, ML, and CPS among the research 
priorities proposed. Furthermore, the PCAST report recommends that US 
Government agencies, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) take steps to ensure data privacy 
and confidentiality for CPSs by developing cybersecurity models using 
statistical/ML and computer science that are characterized, in part, by what 
adversary actions can be withstood. In this section, we explore 3 capabilities for 
software agents (Genesereth and Ketchpel 1994) that can advance CPS security in 
adversarial environments with limited network connectivity: 1) autonomous 
cybersecurity provided by software designed to monitor network security and 
perform other cyber-defensive actions, which resides at the host and operates with 
intelligence and flexibility (Balasubramaniyan et al. 1998); 2) cyber-risk 
quantification, which is lacking in many operational systems (Leslie et al. 2017); 
and 3) adversarial learning to address the fact that cyber systems are often reactive, 
excluding adaptive adversarial decision making and actions that can specifically 
influence intrusion detection and prevention. We refer to this cyber system for CPS 
as an “autonomous cyber-defense agent (ACDA)” throughout. 
6.1 Autonomy 
To advance autonomy, ACDAs for a CPS network with limited interconnectivity 
should automatically switch between processes (e.g., intrusion prediction, IDS, and 
antivirus), learn and adapt from their local environment with real-time data, and 
share estimates and predictions asynchronously. When connectivity is available, 
these agents should use online learning or batch-training techniques; whereas 
during periods of isolation, agents would benefit from operating with fewer features 
in the testing set than those available during training. In a mobile ad hoc network 
(MANET) with Android devices, for example, it is known that using this batch-
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training concept, where agents are downloading and sharing information with their 
peers and C2, can improve efficiency (Chang et al. 2013; Yu and Leslie 2017). 
ACDAs should be able to defend against novel or anomalous cyberattacks for 
which IDS/intrusion protection system (IPS) signatures do not exist, for instance, 
by using anomaly-based detection and unsupervised and semi-supervised learning 
models (Balasubramaniyan et al. 1998). Probabilistic graph models (PGMs) 
provide scalable solutions for estimation in coordinated environments to handle 
issues like rumor propagation (Kschischang et al. 2001), which may ensure 
cybersecurity. However, additional research is needed to validate a successful 
application of PGMs to cybersecurity and risk assessments.  
Although an ACDA should be able to detect cyberattacks with network- and host-
based systems combined with signature- and anomaly-based detection models, 
cyber situational understanding and awareness can enhance the autonomy of these 
entities by integrating cyber-risk quantification to improve ACDA predictions 
regarding the cyber threats and vulnerabilities along with adversarial learning 
algorithms—these computational models simulate the adaptive decision making 
between agents and their adversaries—that can influence the full interconnected 
process for cyber-risk quantification.  
6.2 Cyber-Risk Quantification 
Enhancing an ACDA with intrusion prediction and forecasting models can 
transform the computational algorithms from being solely detection focused to 
incorporating statistical learning models to determine which network activities are 
correlated with and predictive of cyberattacks, including attack graphs (i.e., 
Bayesian), variable length Markov models, semi-supervised learning, and 
generalized linear models (Strapp and Yang 2014; Yang et al. 2014; Leslie et al. 
2017). Modeling cyber vulnerabilities can involve predicting the number of 
successful cyberattacks and the lateral movement of malicious traffic through a 
network. Furthermore, it is known that predicting the lateral movement of an attack 
within the CPS can provide specific details about the cyberattack timing and 
methods. Figure 1 shows the steps involved in cyber-risk modeling. 
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Cyber-risk modeling involves interconnected processes. 
 
Fig. 1   Cyber-risk modeling 
Measuring and examining the similarities between successful cyberattacks—this 
includes attack sequences, tactics, and overarching adversarial strategies—is an 
additional ACDA capability that can reduce exposures to cyber risks. Specifically, 
advancing ACDA cyber-risk assessments involves understanding how well 
observed attack sequence can be “explained” based on other attack sequences (e.g., 
Kullback–Leibler [K-L] divergence). For example, the DARPA Explainable 
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) program (Gunning 2016) focused on improving the 
ability of ML models to explain black box decision making to end-users providing 
the level of trust needed in operating with these autonomous systems (Lei et al. 
2016). This includes developing techniques, such as Local Interpretable Model-
Agnostic Explanations (LIME; Ribeiro et al. 2016) to learn more structured, 
interpretable, and causal models as well as discriminative ML models to infer and 
interrogate explainable models from a black box (Guo et al. 2017). 
More recently, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity’s (IARPA’s) 
Cyber-attack Automated Unconventional Sensor Environment (CAUSE) program 
(Rahmer 2015) calls for forecasting of cyber incidents using unconventional 
signals. The performers have preliminary results to demonstrate the extent data 
such as public sentiment, social media trends, news reports, open threat exchange 
update, dark web transactions, and so on can help forecast future cyber incidents. 
For example, through the use of reconfigurable Bayesian networks with an 
innovative way to deal with imbalanced data, Okutan et al. (2017) show that 
approximately 70% area under curve (AUC) can be achieved to forecast the 
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occurrence of specific cyberattack types on specific organizations. In addition, 
Werner et al. (2017) show the use of time-series analysis using autoregressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) can be effective in some limited cases. 
6.3 Adversarial Learning 
Learning in the presence of adversaries implies that ACDAs need the ability to 
defend themselves against cyberattacks during both training (i.e., data and model 
poisoning) and deployment with adversarial samples. In addition to classifying the 
attackers in terms of their knowledge of the learning models (Papernot et al. 2017) 
or access to the data used for learning (Barreno et al. 2006), we can also define the 
capabilities of an ACDA in terms of robustness to deception based on prior 
knowledge of adversaries’ capabilities (McEneaney et al. 2007, 2008). 
While actual attribution of malware authorship or attacks can be a difficult task due 
to varying levels of attacker deception tactics, learning about their characteristics 
can be a more useful approach. Source code, call graph, and domain similarity, as 
well as other types of semantics, can be used for that purpose. Learning about 
adversarial tactics and behaviors can be used to predict an adversary’s next moves. 
Empirical adversarial models can be generated using semi-supervised learning 
(Strapp and Yang 2014) and likely scenarios can be produced using simulation of 
adversarial behaviors (Moskal et al. 2017).  
In addition, robustness to deception requires that agents address unknown-
unknowns, and to do so, agents must simultaneously address scalability. For 
example, for IoT, millions of devices each requiring the security provided by an 
ACDA could benefit from curse-of-dimensionality-free methods—these 
computational algorithms provide scalability by transforming the information state 
and functions over the information states into idempotent algebras and using highly 
efficient pruning techniques (McEneaney 2009). Furthermore, resource-
constrained agent networks need to address deception with a distributed deception 
robust control approach (Lawson et al. 2015), starting with smaller/multiple local 
games spanning a smaller state space using a priori knowledge and expanding them 
dynamically with observations (Horák et al. 2017). In many cases, cyber robustness 
is a more feasible goal than intrusion detection, and game-theoretic modeling 
provides mission-centric robust decision making in the face of deception using ML 
for improving the information state spanning (McEneaney et al. 2007). Similarly, 
beyond just defending and detecting adversarial attacks, an ACDA must be able to 
adaptively taking measures such as launching of cyber deception as a defensive and 
preventative action (Durkota et al. 2016). For example, agents can have value-based 
tasking and use game-theoretic and optimization approaches to ensure that the 
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information gain/value is maximized with respect to the goal of the agent 
(McEneaney et al. 2008).  
6.4 Conclusion 
Increasing numbers of CPS and IoT devices must operate securely in contested 
environments with limited connectivity. To address these cybersecurity and risk 
challenges, our proposed ACDA for each host has 3 main capabilities that are 
designed to advance CPS security: autonomy, cyber-risk modeling (Strapp and 
Yang 2014; Leslie et al. 2017), and adversarial learning (Moskal et al. 2017; 
Papernot et al. 2017). Cyber-risk and security modeling enhance the situational 
understanding for the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT)—this process involves 
using computational algorithms to predict and detect successful network 
intrusions—by quantifying the combined impact of cyber vulnerabilities and 
threats on a networked and engineered system. Moreover, the framework that we 
propose here for an ACDA also uses adversarial learning and game-theoretic 
modeling techniques to incorporate advanced adversarial decision making and 
cyber deception and advance cyber-risk and security quantification. These 
capabilities are critical for assessing how to increase autonomy in CPS/IoT defense 
and may help ensure that connected entities are interoperable, reliable, and secure. 
7. A Program for Effective and Secure Operations by 
Autonomous Agents and Human Operators in 
Communications-Constrained Tactical Environments 
Authors: Benoit LeBlanc, Paul Losiewicz, and Sylvain Hourlier 
7.1 Background: The Problem Description 
We consider the following question: What specific means can help human operators 
deal with the intersection of remote interactions with autonomous agents in 
bandwidth- or emission-constrained tactical communications environments, with 
the goal of satisfying cybersecurity and emissions control (EMCON) requirements? 
7.2 Plan for Solution 
We employed a 7-step process to design an applied research and development 
program to address the problem: 
1) Clearly identify the applied autonomy problem and goals. 
2) Propose relevant formalisms with which to describe the problem. 
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3) Provide a tactical context within which to bound the problem. 
4) Describe a method for cognitive resource management of the tactical 
communications constraints. 
5) Propose a knowledge representation scheme.  
6) Co-evolve development of the specific autonomous agent platforms and the 
cognitively informed human‒machine interface (HMI). 
7) Design a training program for both autonomous agents and human 
operators. This should be iterative in the course of the development of the 
agents and the HMI. 
7.3 Details of the Solution 
7.3.1 Problem Description 
Effective use of intelligent agent autonomy is the proposed means to offset 
communications constraints imposed by tactical considerations. However, this 
autonomous capability needs to satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
adequate situational awareness, security, and battle management by both local and 
remote human operators. It is proposed that autonomy be applied adaptively to the 
tactical situation at hand, using an extension of a cognitive resource management 
approach developed by the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Cognitique (ENSC) and 
Thales. 
7.3.2 Relevant Formalisms 
We proposed 2 mature candidates: Unified Modeling Language (UML) by the 
Object Management Group (2015) or Entity Relationship Models (ERM) 
developed by Peter Chen (1975), now at Carnegie Mellon University. 
7.3.3 Tactical Context 
We proposed the use of predefined tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for 
cybersecurity and operational security (OPSEC) community human operators (e.g., 
cyber operations for cyber mission forces [CMFs]). We have also employed an 
exemplar tactical context by using an exemplar system for cockpit interactions 
based on work carried out at ENSC. 
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7.4 Proposal of a Cognitive Resource Management Model 
(CRMM) of HMI with Autonomous Agents 
We sketch out a CRMM evaluated to be both adequate and fruitful for use by both 
autonomous agents and human agent operators (Fig. 2). This CRMM was the most 
controversial aspect of our 7-step process. It necessitated a model that was 
relatively mature, but analogical, insofar as the cognitive primitives and processes 
of both software agents and human agents could only be analogically mapped into 
each other at the lower levels of the model. We proposed an extension of one of the 
cognitive models previously developed by Sylvain Hourlier of the Human 
Engineering for Aeronautics Laboratory (HEAL; Hourlier and Suhir 2014). This 
work was jointly developed by ENSC and Thales. It was evaluated to be appropriate 
for use in this domain as 1) it had already been implemented and tested for HMI 
use by Thales Avionics in the AV2020 cockpit demonstrator, and 2) it was felt to 
be sufficiently intuitive to provide a fruitful analogical model for application to 
autonomous agent HMI.  
 
Fig. 2   CRMM process 
In the CRMM, the 4 classical human strategies that favor an economical use of 
operator resources have been analyzed and transposed for this application: 
anticipation, routinization, schematization, and delegation. The original application 
was to incorporate them into the design of avionics to facilitate their use, hence 
favoring better pilot cognitive resource management. The ambition here is to 
analyze these 4 strategies and provide for their opportune application to human‒
autonomous agent collaboration. As the CRMM was developed initially at an 
individual level, it is a logical step up to extend the model to a collective multiple-
agent collaboration.  
The goal of the CRMM is to point to the efforts that we must do in systems 
development to preserve and optimize the cognitive resources of users. Doing that, 
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the human user is adequately prepared to commit their own cognitive resources to 
the realization and consequences of the agent’s action within the context of a larger 
plan. 
The following describes an exemplar hierarchical CRMM: 
1) The base resource level is composed of reflex routines (i.e., purely 
autonomous reflexive procedures, carried out by an agent in 
communications-constrained environments, with possibly no reporting by 
the agent or acknowledgement by the human operator based on EMCON). 
They are presumed to be nonoverrideable by the human operator. Having 
reflexes or automatic routines enables agent autonomy. Full knowledge of 
these reflex actions improves the human user activity, transforming them, 
by extension, into an actor in tactical role playing. Full situational awareness 
by the human operator may be constrained by the EMCON state, however. 
2) The second resource level is composed of semi-autonomous subroutines 
potentially integrated into different specific plans, with planner oversight. 
These are predetermined routines but with oversight (i.e., they are not 
reflexive actions; the agent needs to be told to execute them from among 
alternative actions). The agent needs to receive either a monodirectional 
order to execute, or if not available, an a priori default procedure 
“previsioned” and decided by its own local sensor input. The human 
operator would be aware of what the previsioned defaults are, and which, 
in the appropriate communications environment, could be overridden by the 
human operator. Anticipation is an opportunity for the operator to put their 
own personal indicators in a kind of timeline, which could be developed 
during the action. The human operator is primed to be ready to interoperate.  
3) The third resource level incorporates situation-specific collaborative 
schemas or decision trees with critical decision points that would require 
collaborative input for the agent to execute (i.e., the agent has to wait for 
appropriate information to execute, as the agent cannot execute based on its 
internal sensor input alone). In these cases, the agent requires offboard data 
for a specific situation, and no a priori or default action is possible, such as 
using satellite missile targeting data for over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting. 
Schematization is a way to install pretested procedures related to a tactical 
action, involving diverse reactions, with minimal communications 
exchange. 
4) The highest level envisioned is that of delegation. The agent is here 
reporting aspects of its internal situational awareness of its own capability. 
The agent then delegates an action to be performed by another agent or 
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human operator (e.g., the agent is unable to carry out a predefined 
subroutine or collaborate in a situation-specific schema, and delegates the 
response to an alternate). Delegation adds a kind of autonomous service 
support, activated as needed, within larger actions. The human operator is 
expecting to be offered the lateral use of alternative agents as part of their 
operational toolset.  
All of these levels are inherently emissions-correlated action plans (i.e., the level 
of autonomy and human operator interaction is correlated to the EMCON levels in 
effect). 
7.5 Context-Informed Knowledge Representation 
An adequate knowledge representation scheme for HMI in communications-
constrained tactical environments was evaluated to be the most mission- and 
platform-specific area within this research program. Our strongest insight was that 
we needed compact representations of the information required to satisfy 
operational constraints for individual autonomous platforms and human operators 
within their C2 architectures. These necessary and sufficient minimal 
representations could be designed a priori by referring to mission- or platform-
specific TTPs, but would need validation for adequacy by high-fidelity modeling 
and simulation (M&S) and actual training exercises. 
7.6 Co-Evolution of Agent Autonomy and the HMI 
The recommendation is for iterative design and development of agent autonomy 
along with the HMI to support it. This includes modeling, simulation, and prototype 
testing long before systems are sent to operational test and evaluation (OT&E). 
7.7 Modeling and Simulation and Training 
The requirement for effective M&S and operational training with autonomous 
systems goes without saying. It should be acknowledged by systems developers 
that there may be unanticipated emergent effects that may arise with regard to 
human interaction with autonomous agents. Effective M&S of just autonomous 
agent behavior may be easier to carry out, as we can constrain their behavior when 
we build them. The interaction of autonomous agents and human operators is less 
reliably modeled, due to the possibility of emergent behaviors found in complex 
adaptive systems (CASs) (Holland 2006). This is due to the adaptive behavior of 
all the elements in the system, including the human operators. 
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8. Preventing the “Killer Robot” Scenario 
Authors: Misty Blowers, Hugh Harney, and Gregory Wehner 
What specific means could prevent an autonomous agent from evolving into a killer 
bot or exercising some other undesirable behavior? While the notion of “killer 
robots” may be dramatized by science fiction and popular culture, the potential for 
autonomous systems to produce fatal results is a very serious concern. From 
emerging technologies, such as self-driving vehicles, to established examples, such 
as shipboard automated missile defense systems, autonomous devices with the 
capacity for causing unintended harm are a reality. 
Autonomous agents hold the promise of highly efficient execution of complex 
tasks, with the implication that the agents can perform the task as well as or better 
than a human counterpart. The other side of that promise is that these agents will 
behave in ways we cannot predict. For any autonomous agent scenario, the risk of 
harm can be determined as a factor of the reach of impact of the system affected by 
the autonomous agent. Impact is the measure of unintended harmful consequences 
of the affected systems. For example, for an autonomous weapons system, impact 
is the damage the weapon can cause and reach is the range of the weapon. Reach 
must not exceed the boundary of need—which is determined by the value of the 
system mission—and need must be considered against the consequences of 
potential impact. 
Consider an air-gapped autonomous agent deployed on a remote device in a 
dangerous environment. The agent has the capability to administer the remote 
device in the absence of human oversight based upon mission parameters and the 
data it collects from its environment. The risk may be assessed by quantifying and 
characterizing the potential impact of the remote device the agent administrates. Is 
it a weapon system, a communications relay, or a radar station? Can the components 
be manipulated by misuse or neglect to produce dangerous conditions? Do those 
conditions outweigh the need met by the system? In the example of an air-gapped 
autonomous system, there is a perception that the “reach”, or ability to affect other 
systems or assets, is limited. However, this is not always the case. The “Stuxnet” 
worm is a perfect example of how a cyber payload designed for a specific target 
system made its way to the outside world and had unintended effects.  
Another scenario is a “bot”, or self-contained software program in a distributed 
network, capable of making decisions on what actions to take to either defend or 
attack a network environment. It may base these decisions upon information that it 
senses and learns from the network environment or from information it receives 
from other “bots” operating in the same environment. Such agents are often driven 
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by a type of utility function, such as minimizing the number of nodes in this 
network environment that are compromised by malware. For a networked device, 
risk is harder to define—as the range of potential impact to consider may extend to 
every device in the network. What are the implications if the “bot” spreads to the 
wide-area network? Depending on the capacity of the agent, software boundaries 
may limit the reach, but it is prudent to be cautious of this assumption. Risk in this 
scenario is tightly bound to the level of effect the agent can produce on the network 
and other networks that are connected to it. Consideration should also be given to 
a peer-to-peer, or robot-to-robot, oversight, which may result in more sophisticated 
solution spaces than those constrained by human comprehension. The distribution 
and networking of these autonomous devices extend the basic logic, allowing group 
interactions that can operate counter to the mission as stated. 
We therefore frame prevention as the reduction of risk of impact and the resilience 
to both intentional and unintentional compromise. An unintentional compromise is 
the result of a malfunction or unforeseen circumstance for which the system is ill 
pre-prepared. An intentional compromise is the result of a malicious act that results 
in an effect outside of the intended design or purpose. Prevention can be broken 
into 2 main approaches: restriction, or bounded autonomy, and self-guidance driven 
by some ethical code of behavior. 
Some members of the scientific community believe that autonomous capabilities 
should be designed with boundaries and limitations, while others believe that the 
learning mechanism should not be constrained until sufficient M&S has been 
conducted to allow the autonomy to discover complex solution spaces that would 
have been outside the bounds of human definition. As an approach to prevention, 
restriction is clearly the first design decision that must be taken into account.  
Limiting autonomy produces a fundamental reduction of impact, yet it may not 
allow the system to meet the mission need. Other restrictions may applied for 
unshackled agents—mechanical governors on device range, resource restrictions 
that limit impact, or network restrictions to limit mobility. Supervision is a form of 
external restriction, where manual overrides, backdoors, and input dependencies 
for execution tie impact to human judgment. The most important restriction may be 
on market deployment. The promise of benefits cannot be allowed to outstrip the 
rigors of research and development. Fielding devices with agents whose capacity 
for impact is not fully understood would be a failure of humanity, not artificial 
intelligence. 
The notion of self-guidance approaches the field of robot ethics. How can 
autonomous agents be imparted with decision rulesets that guide their own 
evolution and interactions, and how can those rulesets be partitioned off from the 
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range of effect. It is hard enough to determine ethical guidance regarding human 
agents, and even with clear rules, humans do not always follow them. Let’s assume 
we somehow design an autonomous agent to follow the Geneva Convention—what 
happens if the device sensors that identify humans malfunction or are deliberately 
sabotaged? What if an autonomous car is deceived into identifying sidewalks as 
roads? Can an autonomous agent reach the conclusion that they are causing impact 
and assess their own guidance protocols? If those protocols have been corrupted, 
what action should the agent take? It may be the case that these rulesets be 
partitioned in such a way that any change to them immediately causes the agent 
destroy itself, and perhaps even the device it affects. 
Looking ahead, there seem to be 2 types of these peer-to-peer interactions that need 
to be understood. The first behavior is related to operations as a cooperative system 
rather than as an isolated device. This system-level behavior can be understood if 
we examine network gateways that we will assume are autonomous. Each gateway 
may learn that a reduction in performance may be the appropriate response to 
sudden increases in traffic from a single source. However, if all gateways have this 
logic, then the response to an emergency state may result in the gateways reducing 
performance exactly at the time it is needed the most. Basic research is needed to 
capture human-like judgment ontology and logic. This is a challenging topic given 
that judgment logic needs to be embedded on independent devices all operating 
with imperfect knowledge. At first blush, a structure for heterogeneous logic is 
required to facilitate distributed mission accomplishment. This mirrors the 
judgment of humans; people apply heterogeneous logic and thereby avoid some 
fragile vulnerability states. 
The second behavior relates to the autonomous system interacting with the 
embedding environment. Again, the autonomous system needs to develop some 
human-like characteristic that is arguably rare in even human systems—judgment 
of reasonable appropriate response. Consider a distributed net of military robot 
guardians protecting a resource. An adversary probes the area. The guardians have 
the option to not respond (preserving the secrecy of location), respond with minimal 
force, or respond at total capability. The judgment normally performed by humans 
will consider the situation at hand, then make a value judgment. Basic research is 
needed to develop a definition, creation, and testing of this judgment logic. 
Advances in game theory point to some attractive research that could lead to 
advances in this logic. Choosing appropriate objective and reward functions may 
also be critical to the evolution of behaviors. To add to the complexity, this logic 
further needs to account for distributed autonomous processing and execution. 
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If we look at independent agents operating in a system using similar logic and 
requiring similar resources, we then could consider a classic CAS. CASs have been 
studied using very simple logic. There are classic behaviors that seem to occur 
across observed systems (from agriculture to epidemiology). These systems tend to 
create organized behaviors that work while the system has ample resources; 
however, these systems tend to show changes in organization under stress, leading 
to catastrophic failure modality. 
Current testing and simulation models need basic advances to facilitate multilevel 
tests. Today, atomic device testing would validate proper functionality in isolation. 
Research is needed to define a peer-to-peer networked functionality definition and 
compositions adequate for validation of autonomous group functionality in 
multiple complex scenarios. Finally, the autonomous group must be tested in 
realistic emulations of the larger environment where it is intended to operate, not 
just to assess its risks as one agent, but the risks that arise from a single agent’s 
interactions with a larger distributed system. This will require an ontology spanning 
multiple environments with sufficient complexity to define success and failure 
conditions. More test and evaluation are necessary to reduce risk of the “killer robot 
scenario” and allow the community to develop autonomous capabilities that can 
incorporate complex human judgment with compassion and vision. 
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9. “Hello, World” Autonomous Agent 
Authors: Alessandro Guarino, Jana Komárková, and James Rowell 
The challenge we tackle in this section is the design of an actual autonomous agent, 
small and simple to implement but able to illustrate the essential functions any 
autonomous intelligent agent (AIA) should possess, albeit in a streamlined way. 
The agent proposed here is a purely software agent intended for cyber defense only. 
To be a proper AIA, it should fulfill the following 6 characteristics: 
1) An agent is strictly associated with its environment: an autonomous agent 
outside the environment it was designed for can be useless, or not even an 
agent at all. Franklin and Graesser (1996) have given a convincing 
definition of agents and the ways in which they differ from other software. 
The first 4 points in our definition draw from their definition. 
2) An agent interacts with the environment, via appropriate sensors 
providing input from it and appropriate actuators, allowing the agent to 
act and influence that environment. 
3) An autonomous agent acts toward a goal, or, in other words, it has an 
“agenda”. In particular, an autonomous agent developed for warfare 
operations is assigned a target. 
4) The activities of a truly autonomous agent are sustained “over time”, so it 
must have a continuity of action. 
5) An autonomous agent should possess an adequate internal model of its 
environment, including its goal—expressed possibly in terms of world 
states—together with some kind of performance measure or utility 
function that expresses its preferences. 
6) An agent must possess the capability to learn new knowledge and the 
possibility to modify over time its model of the world and possibly also 
its goals and preferences. 
In this section, we describe the agent and explain how it fulfills these requirements. 
We define its environment, task, and properties, such as sensors and actions. We 
also discuss possible extensions of the agent. 
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To make these “Hello, world” autonomous agents feasible, the design makes 
specific assumptions about the environment in which the agent operates, and the 
number and type of inputs and outputs its sensors and actuators will have. This has 
the aim of keeping the complexity low. 
9.1 Environment 
AGENTX lives in a virtualized cloud environment that supplies some unspecified 
cloud-based service. We assume this platform runs 3 kinds of virtual machines 
(VMs, or virtual servers): database servers, application servers, and web servers. 
We also assume that a hypervisor exists to manage the platform and balance the 
load. 
9.2 Task 
Again, for the sake of simplicity, AGENTX performs one specific function and not 
in an open-ended generic network defense mission. Its goal is to manage a set of 
honeypot (HP) virtual servers with the objective to deceive adversaries and deflect 
cyberattacks against the cloud platform. Its architecture is monolithic (as opposed 
to a distributed, swarm-like structure) and operates at the hypervisor level of the 
system. To perform some of the available actions, AGENTX relies on small applets 
installed on each virtual server, for instance, exposing a RESTful application 
programming interface (API). It must be noted that in the context of this proof of 
concept, security measures that in a real environment would be mandatory are 
overlooked (e.g., encryption of communications, self-protection of the agent itself, 
and so on). 
Since the mission of AGENTX is purely deception, it implements the capability of 
communicating to other autonomous agents (and/or to human supervisors) the 
necessity to intervene and implement active defense measures. 
The agent has access to background information, such as a set of ready-made HP 
images, dummy process containers, and dummy files. 
9.3 Sensors 
The sensors are able to access the following data and information: 
• Alerts from IDSs (count and severity) 
• Integrity information of critical files on the VMs 
• Metadata about critical files on the VMs 
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• Processes 
• Log files 
• Metrics on the level of use of resources and system load 
• Feedback and replies from other agents tasked with active measures 
9.4 Actions 
The following actions are available to the agent: 
• Starting and stopping HP VMs. 
• Starting and stopping actual virtual server instances (optionally). 
• Initiating a “cry for help” message to other agents (or humans). 
• Deploying dummy files and applications, and quarantine files (via the 
applets). 
9.5 Learning 
The agent implements a reinforcement learning model employing an appropriate 
reward function: 
 CW
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where 
honey_events: metric for attacks/events against the HPs;  
security_events: number of attacks against the real servers (detected by IDSs); 
total_resources: metric for the total amount of resources available; 
Δ_resources: resources freed or needed (example, spinning HPs) to implement an 
action by the agent (negative when resources are needed, positive when resources 
are freed);  
justified_CFH: “justified cries for help”, number of messages (alerts) sent by the 
agent reacting to actual attacks; and 
CW: “cry wolf”, number of messages sent by the agent requesting assistance for 
attacks that did not really happen. 
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The coefficients a, b, c state the relative importance of each factor. They should be 
tuned beforehand or during the initial learning phase. 
We consider total resources available as those actually available at the time of 
action, which makes the function and the agent’s behavior dynamic during that 
time. It also means that a relatively costly action is not penalized if the system is 
under very light load, because the number of available resources is high and even 
small actions are heavily penalized if the system is utilizing almost all its resources. 
Note that this function could be calculated—in a future version of AGENTX—for 
homogeneous groups of VMs (e.g., only the application servers), to better reflect 
the situation and the world state, providing AGENTX with a more granular and 
detailed view of its environment. 
The learning is performed by implementing an anomaly detector leveraging a small 
set of hard-coded features (for the purposes of this section) including the following: 
• Number and severity of IDS alerts 
• Anti-malware software alerts 
• Unauthorized accesses  
• Access to HPs or dummy files 
• Alerts from dummy processes 
• File integrity violations 
• System load (aggregate, by group, and individual) 
9.6 Testing 
To validate the performance of the agent, we have to set up a testing environment, 
perform real attacks, and evaluate its efficiency. Since the agent is learning with 
each attack, we should let the evaluation continue for some time so the learning 
process can take place. It would also be ideal to face the agent with real attackers, 
not only simulated attacks.  
We propose to validate the agent on defending a network with several servers in a 
virtualized environment with simulated “regular” traffic. The setup has the 
following advantage: since we know which traffic was generated by us, we can 
safely assume the rest of the traffic comes from the attacker; therefore, we can 
easily recognize the justified and unjustified cries for help. The detection part is 
also easily achieved in this setup. We can leave the network running for a long time 
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with little effort. To prevent the abuse of the compromised machines, we can let the 
“servers” actually be high-interaction HPs. 
9.7 Additional Considerations 
Future developments include, of course, the use of real-world tools to implement 
the autonomous agents (while this proof of concept could be developed in a 
scripting language like Python), the implementation of all possible security 
measures to secure and protect the agent, as well as the development of the 
cooperative agents postulated previously. 
Moving away from a monolithic architecture (at the hypervisor level) to a swarm-
like distributed architecture of agents living on every VM on the system is another 
valid possibility. 
9.8 Further Reading 
Guarino A., Autonomous intelligent agents in cyber offence. In: Podins K, 
Stinissen J, Maybaum M, editors. 5th International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict – Proceedings; 2013 June 4-7; Tallinn, Estonia. IEEE. 
Russell S, Norvig P. Artificial intelligence: a modern approach. 3rd ed. London 
(UK): Pearson, 2010. ISBN: 978-0136042594. 
10. Conclusions 
Environmental factors—such as mobility, lethality, connectivity, and power 
constraints—limit specific functions and abilities of particular agents and the 
combination of these factors place an upper bound on agents’ capability. 
Development and deployment of autonomous agents in the military context is full 
of caveats and will require much consideration before agents are mature enough to 
be used in mission-critical systems on the battlefield. Future work will require 
advances in multi-agent architectures, human‒agent interfaces, agent reliability, 
agent resiliency, agent resource requirements, and agent standardization. The 
promises of autonomous agents are great, but much work remains to ensure they 
can operate in a variety of environments. 
Possible data sources for autonomous agents can be largely divided into 5 
categories: 1) network traffic, 2) event logs, 3) hardware sensor data, 4) OS-level 
software sensor data, and 5) high-level inputs. While actually collecting and 
labeling more of the exercise data are comparatively easy to address in exercise 
planning, the scale/timespan/variety of live exercises is by definition limited by 
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resource availability. A complementary approach is to create realistic data sets on 
demand in emulated/simulated testbeds capable of supporting arbitrary network 
topologies, sufficiently real hardware, real OS/application/attack/defense software, 
and a combination of synthetic and real actors.  
The determination of an optimal course of action may need to be computed in a 
small amount of time, with limited resources. An agent may be required to respond 
to the actions of intelligent actors (human or otherwise) with partial knowledge 
about the system they are protecting or the impact of its own actions. A suitable 
decision-making approach should take into account not only the properties of the 
agent itself, but the environment and context in which a decision must be made.  
The agent must incorporate several capabilities. Firstly, the agent needs to perceive 
its environment by evaluating the state of its computer system(s), detecting 
changes, and deciding whether those changes are suspicious. If it does indeed detect 
suspicious changes, the agent must respond in an appropriate and timely manner. 
Secondly, the agent needs to manage trust relationships with other agents and 
humans through communication and cooperation. Lastly, throughout its activities, 
the agent needs to assess itself and its goals, and proactively initiate goal-directed 
actions to improve its performance and exploit opportunities when possible. 
Agents will reside on devices that must operate securely in contested environments 
with limited connectivity. To address these cybersecurity and risk challenges, the 
agent should have capabilities related to ML: autonomy, cyber-risk modeling, and 
adversarial learning. 
An agent’s autonomous capability needs to satisfy the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for adequate situational awareness, security, and battle management by 
both local and remote human operators. To this end, efforts must be undertaken in 
systems development to preserve and optimize the cognitive resources of users. 
Doing that, the human user is adequately prepared to commit their own cognitive 
resources to the realization and consequences of the agent’s action within the 
context of a larger plan. 
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IPS intrusion protection system  
K-L Kullback–Leibler  
MANET mobile ad hoc network 
ML machine learning 
MORE Multiple OS Rotational Environment  
MTD moving target defense 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NSF National Science Foundation 
OMG Object Management Group 
OTE Operational Test and Evaluation 
OTH over the horizon targeting 
PCAST President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
PfP Partnership for Peace 
TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
UML Unified Modeling Language 
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